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Abstract. De Meyer and Moussa Saley [4] provide an endogenous justiﬁcation
for the appearance of Brownian Motion in Finance by modeling the strategic
interaction between two asymmetrically informed market makers with a zero-sum
repeated game with one-sided information. The crucial point of this justiﬁcation
is the appearance of the normal distribution in the asymptotic behavior of
Vn(P) √
n .
In De Meyer and Moussa Saley’s model [4], agents can ﬁx a price in a continuous
space. In the real world however, the market compels the agents to post prices
in a discrete set. The previous remark raises the following question: Does the
normal density still appear in the asymptotic of Vn √
n for the discrete market game?
The main topic of this paper is to prove that for all discretization of the price set,
Vn(P) √
n converges uniformly to 0. Despite of this fact, we do not reject De Meyer,
Moussa analysis: when the size of the discretization step is small as compared to
n− 1
2, the continuous market game is a good approximation of the discrete one.
1991 Mathematics Subject Classiﬁcation. 91A20, 91B26.
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1. Introduction
Financial models of the price dynamic on the stock market often incorporate a
Brownian term (see for instance Black and Scholes [3]). This Brownian term is
often explained exogenously in the literature: the price of an asset depends on a
very long list of parameters which are subject to inﬁnitesimal random variations
with time (as for instance the demographic parameters). Due to an aggregation
result in the spirit of the Central Limit theorem, these variations are responsible for
the Brownian term in the price dynamic. However, this kind of explanation does
not apply to discontinuous parameters that are quite frequent in the real world.
For instance, the technological index of a ﬁrm will typically jump whenever a new
production process is discovered. With the above exogenous explanation, such a
discontinuity of the parameter process (a shock) would automatically generate a
discontinuity of the price process. In [4], De Meyer and Moussa Saley provide
an endogenous justiﬁcation for the appearance of the Brownian term even in case
of discontinuous parameters. They also explain how the market will preserve the
continuity of the price process. Their explanation is based on the informational
asymmetries on the market. When such a shock happens, some agent are informed
and others are not. At each transaction, the optimal behavior of the informed agents
will be a compromise between an intensive use of his information at that period and
a constant concern of preserving his informational advantage for the next periods.
To obtain this compromise, the insiders will slightly noise their actions day after
day and asymptotically these noises will aggregate in a Brownian Motion.
To support this thesis, De Meyer and Moussa Saley analyze the interaction between
two asymmetrically informed market makers : Two market makers, player 1 and 2,
are trading two commodities N and R. Commodity N is used as num´ eraire and has
a ﬁnal value of 1. Commodities R( R for risky asset ) has a ﬁnal value depending
on the state k of nature k ∈ K := {L,H}. The ﬁnal value of commodity R is 0 in
state L and 1 in state H. By ﬁnal value of an asset, we mean its liquidation price
at a ﬁxed horizon T, when the state of nature will be publicly known.
The state of nature k is initially chosen at random once for all, the probability of H
and L being respectively P and 1 − P. Both players are aware of this probability.
Player 1 is informed of the resulting state k while player 2 is not.
The transactions between the players, up to date T, take place during n consec-
utive rounds. At round q ( q = 1,...,n ), player 1 and 2 propose simultaneously a
price p1,q ∈ D and p2,q ∈ D for 1 unit of commodity R ( D ⊂ IR ). The maximal
bid wins and one unit of commodity R is transacted at this price. If both bids are
equal, no transaction happens.
In other words, if yq = (yR
q ,yN
q ) denotes player 1’s portfolio after round q, we have
yq = yq−1 + t(p1,q,p2,q), with
t(p1,q,p2,q) := 1 1p1,q>p2,q(1,−p1,q) + 1 1p1,q<p2,q(−1,p2,q).CONTINUOUS VERSUS DISCRETE MARKET GAMES 3
The function 1 1p1,q>p2,q takes the value 1 if p1,q > p2,q and 0 otherwise.
At each round the players are supposed to remind the previous bids including
those of their opponent. The ﬁnal value of player 1’s portfolio yn is then 1 1k=HyR +
yN. We consider the players are risk neutral, so that the utility of the players is
the expectation of the ﬁnal value of their own ﬁnal portfolio. There is no loss of
generality to assume that initial portfolios are (0,0) for both players. With that
assumption, the game GD
n (P) thus described is a zero-sum repeated game with one-
sided information as introduced by Aumann and Maschler [1].
As indicated above, the informed player will introduce a noise on his actions.
Therefore, the notion of strategy we have in mind here is that of behavior strategy.
More precisely, a strategy σ of player 1 in GD
n (P) is a sequence σ = (σ1,...,σn),
where σq is the lottery on D used by player 1 at stage q to selects his price p1,q. This
lottery will depend on player 1’s information at that stage which includes the state
as well as both player’s past moves. Therefore σq is a (measurable) mapping from
{H,L} × Dq−1 to the set ∆(D) of probabilities on D. In the same way, a strategy
τ of player 2 is a sequence (τ1,...,τn) such that τq : Dq−1 → ∆(D).
A pair of strategies (σ,τ) joint to P induces a unique probability ΠP,σ,τ on the
histories k ∈ {H,L},p1,1,p2,1,...,p1,n,p2,n. The payoﬀ g(P,σ,τ) in GD
n (P) corre-
sponding to the pair of strategy (σ,τ) is then EΠP,σ,τ[1 1k=HyR + yN].








and the minimal amount player 2 can guarantee not to pay more is V
D
n (P) :=
infτ supσ g(P,σ,τ). If both quantities coincide the game is said to have a value. A
strategy σ (resp. τ) such that V
D
n (P) = infτ g(P,σ,τ) (resp. V
D
n (P) := supσ g(P,σ,τ)
is said to be optimal.
Before dealing with the main topic of this paper, let us discuss the economical
interpretation of this model. A ﬁrst observation concerns the fact that the model is
a zero sum game with positive value: This means in particular that the uninformed
market maker will lose money in this game, so, why should he take part to this
game? To answer this objection, we argue that, once an institutional has agreed to
be a market maker, he is committed to do so. The only possibility for him not to
participate to the market would be by posting prices with a huge bid-ask spread.
However, there are rules on the market that limit drastically the allowed spreads.
In this model the spread is considered as null since the unique price posted by a
player is both a bid and an ask price. The above model has to be considered as the
game between two agents that already have signed as Market Makers, one of which
receives after this some private information.
The second remark we would like to do here is on the transaction rule: The price
posted by a Market Maker commits him only for a limited amount: when a bigger
number of shares is traded, the transaction happens at a negotiated price which is4 ALEXANDRE MARINO AND BERNARD DE MEYER
not the publicly posted price. We suppose in this model that the price posted by a
Market Maker only commits him for one share.
Now, if two market makers post a prices that are diﬀerent, say p1 > p2, there will
clearly be a trader that will take advantage of the situation: The trader will buy the
maximal amount (one share) at the lowest price (p2) and sell it to the other market
maker at price p1. So, if p1 > p2, one share of the risky asset goes from market
maker 1 to market maker 2, and this is indeed what happens in the above model.
The above remark also entails that each market maker trades the share at his own
price in num´ eraire. This is not taken into account in De Meyer Moussa Saley model,
since the transaction happens there for both market makers at the maximal price.
Introducing this in the model would make the analysis much more diﬃcult: the
game would not be zero sum any more, and all the duality techniques used in [4]
would not apply. The analysis of a model with non zero sum transaction rules goes
beyond the scope of this paper, but will hopefully be the subject of a forthcoming
publication.
De Meyer- Moussa Saley were dealing with the particular case D = [0,1] and the
corresponding game will be denoted here Gc
n(P) (c for continuous) and their main
results, including the appearance of the Brownian motion, are reminded in the next
section.
It is assumed in Gc
n that the prices posted by the market makers are any real
numbers in [0,1]. In the real world however, market makers are committed to use
only a limited numbers of digits, typically four. In this paper, we are concerned
with the same model but under the additional requirement that the prices belong
to some discrete set: we will also consider the discretized game Gl
n(P) := GDl
n (P)
where Dl := { i
l−1,i = 0,...,l − 1}. The main topic of this paper is the analysis of
the eﬀects of this discretization.
As we will see, the discretized game is quite diﬀerent from the continuous one:
It is much more costly to noise his prices for the informed agent in Gl
n than in Gc
n:
he must use lotteries on prices that diﬀer at least by the tick δ := 1
l−1 while in Gc
n,
the optimal strategies are lotteries whose support is asymptotically very small (and
thus smaller than δ).
The question we address in this paper is the following: As n → ∞, does the
Brownian motion appear in the asymptotic dynamics of the price process for the
discretized game?
As we will see in section 3, the answer is negative. At ﬁrst sight, this result questions
the validity of De Meyer, Moussa’s analysis.
We compare therefore in section 5 the discrete game with the continuous one. In
particular, we show that the continuous model remains a good approximation of
the discrete one, as far as
√
nδ is small, where δ is the discretization step and n is
the number of transactions. When this is the case, we prove that discretizing the




nδ is small in general explains why the analysis made in [4] remains valid.CONTINUOUS VERSUS DISCRETE MARKET GAMES 5
2. Reminder on the continuous game Gc
n
De Meyer, Moussa Saley prove in [4] that the game Gc
n(P) has a value V c
n(P).
Furthermore, they provide explicit optimal strategies for both players.
The keystone of their analysis is the recursive structure of the game, and a new
parametrization of the ﬁrst stage strategy spaces. Namely, at the ﬁrst stage, player
1 selects a lottery σ1 on the ﬁrst price p1 he will post, lottery depending on his
information k ∈ {H,L}. In fact, his strategy may be viewed as a probability distri-
butions π on (k,p1) satisfying: π[k = H] = P.
In turn, such a probability π may be represented as a pair of functions (f,Q)
([0,1] → [0,1]) satisfying :
(2.1)
(1) f is increasing
(2)
R 1
0 Q(u)du = P
(3) ∀x,y ∈ [0,1] : f(x) = f(y) ⇒ Q(x) = Q(y)
The set of these pairs will be denoted by Γc
1(P) in the sequel.
Given such a pair (f,Q), player 1 generates the probability π as follows: he ﬁrst
selects a random number u uniformly distributed on [0,1], he plays then p1 := f(u)
and he then chooses k ∈ K at random with a lottery such that p[k = H] = Q(u).
In the same way, the ﬁrst stage strategy of player 2 is a probability distribution for
p2 ∈ [0,1]. To pick p2 at random, player 2 may proceed as follows: given a increasing
function h :[0,1] → [0,1], he selects a random number u uniformly distributed on
[0,1] and he plays p2 = h(u). Any distribution can be generated in this way and
therefore we may identify the strategy space of player 2 with set Γc
2 of these functions
h.
Based on that representation of player 1 ﬁrst stage strategies, the recursive formula
for V c
n becomes:



















A ﬁrst move optimal strategy σ1 in Gc









After the ﬁrst stage, player 1 plays optimally in Gc
n(Q(u)).
Another useful tool in De Meyer, Moussa Saley analysis is Fenchel duality: it is
quite natural to use it in this framework since V c
n is proved to be concave.6 ALEXANDRE MARINO AND BERNARD DE MEYER
Deﬁnition 2.2. the Fenchel conjugate f∗ (or simply conjugate ) of f is deﬁned as
follows: f∗ : IR → [−∞,+∞) such that :
f
∗(x) = infP∈[0,1]xP − f(P)
From this deﬁnition, it is obvious that:
(2.2) If f ≤ g then g∗ ≤ f∗
The Fenchel conjugate W c
n := (V c
n)∗ of V c
n may be interpreted as the value of a
dual game. The recursive structure of this dual game is particularly well suited to
analyze the optimal strategies of player 2.







where Λc(g)(x) = suph∈Γc
2infp1∈[0,1]R[x](p1,h,g),
with
R[x](p1,h,g) := g(x −
Z 1
0
1 1h(u)<p1 − 1 1h(u)>p1du) −
Z 1
0
1 1h(u)<p1(−p1) + 1 1h(u)>p1h(u)du







The following Formulas, corresponding to the formula (6) and (8) in [4], provide
explicit optimal strategies for player 1 in Gc




Q(u) = (W c
n)0(λ + 1 − 2u)
where (W c
n)0 is the derivative of the function W c
n and λ is such that the expectation
of Q is equal to P. The following explicit expression for optimal h∗ is given in








0(x − 2s + 1)ds
The main result of [4] is the appearance of Brownian Motion in the asymptotic
dynamic of the price process in Gc
n(P) as n goes to inﬁnity: Since optimal strategy
of players are explicitly known, we may compute the distribution of the proposed
price process of player 1 (pn
1,1,...,pn
1,n) in Gc
n(P). This process pn
1 may be viewed as




n ≤ t <
q+1
n .
With the previous notation, De Meyer and Moussa Saley (see [4]) prove the following
asymptotic result:
Theorem 2.4. As n goes to ∞ , the process Πn
t converges in law, in the sense of
ﬁnite distributions, to the following process Π:
Πt = F(
zp + Bt √
1 − t
)CONTINUOUS VERSUS DISCRETE MARKET GAMES 7
Where F(x) =
R ∞
x f(z)dz , zp is such that F(zp) = p and Bt is a Brownian Mo-
tion. The process Π is a [0,1]-valued continuous martingale starting at P at time 0.
Furthermore Π1 belongs almost surely to {0,1}.
This result is in fact related to the following one:








n(P) converges to 1 √




In the next section, we prove that the value V l
n(P) of the discretized game doesn’t
have the same asymptotic as V c
n(P). There is therefore no hope for the appearance of
a Brownian Motion in the dynamic of the discretized price process. This phenomena
could heuristically be explained as follows.
From theorem 15 and lemma 9 in [4], there exists a constant C such that for all













n − m is less than the discretization step 1
l−1 the players
should post the same price. Due to the transaction rules, this means a zero payoﬀ
for both players in the beginning of the game. This will be true as far as m ≤
n−((l−1)C)2, so only ((l−1)C)2 transactions could give a positive payoﬀ ( smaller
than 1) to player 1: the value of the discrete market game would be bounded by
((l − 1)C)2. This is the content of theorem 3.1.
3. The discretized game Gl
n
In this section we are concerned with the game Gl
n := GDl
n
where Dl := { i
l−1,i = 0,...,l − 1}.
This game is in fact a standard repeated game as introduced in Aumann Mashler





     

0 δ − 1 ... iδ − 1 (i + 1)δ − 1 ... 0
1 − δ 0 ... ... ... ... 0
... ... 0 iδ − 1 ... ... ...
1 − iδ ... 1 − iδ 0 (i + 1)δ − 1 ... ...
1 − (i + 1)δ ... ... 1 − (i + 1)δ 0 ... ...
... ... ... ... ... 0 0
0 ... ... ... ... 0 0


     






    

0 δ ... iδ (i + 1)δ ... 1
− δ 0 ... ... ... ... 1
... ... 0 iδ ... ... ...
− iδ ... − iδ 0 (i + 1)δ ... ...
− (i + 1)δ ... ... − (i + 1)δ 0 ... ...
... ... ... ... ... 0 1
− 1 ... ... ... ... − 1 0

 
    

(Line i corresponds to price p1 = iδ with δ = 1
l−1, and similarly for column j.)
From Aumann and Maschler’s paper, the game Gl
n(P) has a value hereafter de-
noted by V l
n(P) and both players have optimal strategies.
The next section is devoted to the proof of the next theorem:
Theorem 3.1. For n = 0,1,..., for all P ∈ [0,1], V l
n(P) is an increasing sequence in
n with limit gl(P), where gl(P) is linear for P in [ k
l−1, k+1
l−1] for each k in {0,...,l−2}
and such that for P in Dl, gl(P) := P(1 − P) 1
2δ.
The proof of this theorem is based on the well known recursive structure of the
Aumann and Maschler repeated games that expresses V l
n+1 as T(V l
n) where T is the
following recursive operator:












with σ = PσH + (1 − P)σL and, if σ(i) > 0, P(i) =
PσH(i)
σ(i) .
The pair (σH,σL) joint to P induces a probability distribution on K × Dl which in
turn can be represented by its marginal distribution σ on Dl and by P(.), where
P(i) is as above the conditional probability of H given i. In particular we have










To play optimally in Gl
n(P), player 1 proceeds as follows: At the ﬁrst stage, he
plays σH and σL optimal in T(V l
n−1)(P) and he then computes the a posteriori
P 1(i1) := P(i1). From there on, he plays optimally in Gl
n−1(P 1(i1)). In particular,
he plays at the second stage an optimal move in T(V l
n−2)(P 1(i1)). He then computes
the a posteriori probability P 2(i1,i2) of H and plays for the remaining stages an
optimal strategy in Gl
n−2(P 2(i1,i2)). So that the a posteriori martingale P 1,...,P n
may be viewed as a stage variable for player 1: at stage q, he just has to remind P q
to play optimally in Gl
n(P).CONTINUOUS VERSUS DISCRETE MARKET GAMES 9
The fact that V l
n is increasing in n just results from the fact that for all concave
continuous function V , V ≤ T(V ) (see lemma 4.2).
We then have to prove that V l
n is bounded from above by gl. Since T is an
increasing operator (if h ≤ g then T(h) ≤ T(g)), a positive ﬁxed point g for operator
T will be an upper bound for V l
n (see lemma 4.3). We have then to ﬁnd such a ﬁxed
point, but the operator T is a bit complicated to analyze directly so we introduce an
operator T ∗ that dominates T (for all V , T(V ) ≤ T ∗(V )) for which we prove that
gl is a ﬁxed point and therefore also a ﬁxed point for T (see lemma 4.4).
It then remains to prove the convergence of V l
n to gl and this is obtained as follows:
Since we suspect that for high n, V l
n should be close to gl, the optimal strategy in
T(V l
n) should be close to an optimal strategy in T(gl). We then consider a strategy
σn,l of player 1 in Gl
n(P) that consists at stage q in playing the optimal strategy in
T(gl)(P q), where P q is the a-posteriori after stage q. The amount Cl
n(P) guaranteed
by that strategy in Gl
n(P) is clearly a lower bound of V l
n(P).
We next prove that Cl
n converges to gl as follows:
When P belongs to Dl\{0,1}, we prove in theorem 4.11 that the following strategy
(σH,σL) is optimal in T(gl)(P): let P + := P +δ and P − := P −δ. Both σH and σL
are lotteries on the prices P and P − with σH(P) = P+
2P and σL(P) = 1−P+
2(1−P). With
such a strategy, player 1 plays P with probability PσH(P) + (1 − P)σL(P) = 1
2
and therefore P 1(P) is equal to 2PσH(P) = P +. Similarly player 1 plays P −
with probability PσH(P −) + (1 − P)σL(P −) = 1
2 and therefore P 1(P −) is equal to
2PσH(P −) = P −. Therefore, with that strategy the a posteriori P 1 and the price
posted by player 1 diﬀer at most by δ. Furthermore, the a posteriori belongs clearly
to Dl.
The price process induced by the strategy σn,l remains at most at a distance δ
of the a posteriori martingale (P q)q=1,...,n. If P q is in ]0,1[, then P q+1 is equal to
P q,+ or P q,−, each with probability 1
2. Furthermore, if P q is equal to 0 or 1 then
P q+1 = P q and the prices ﬁxed by player 1 are respectively 0 and 1. So, the process
(P q)q=1,...,n is a Dl-valued symmetric random walk stopped at the time τ when it
reaches 0 or 1.
As proved in theorem 4.11, the best reply of player 2 against σn,l is to post at
stage q a price equal to P q−1. So, this allows us to compute explicitly Cl
n. At stage
q, player 1 get exactly
E[1 1p1>Pq−1(P q − p1) + 1 1p1<Pq−1(P q−1 − P q)]
The price posted by player 1 is either P q−1 or P q−1 − δ, so the ﬁrst term is always
equal to 0. The second term takes only the value δ when the price posted by player
1 is P q−1 −δ which happens with probability 1
2. Hence, the expectation is just δ
2, if
P q−1 is not equal to 0 or 1. In case P q−1 = 0 or 1, the previous expectation is equal10 ALEXANDRE MARINO AND BERNARD DE MEYER
to 0. As a consequence, Cl













Let us observe that for a symmetric Dl-valued random walk with jumps of size δ,
((P q)2 − qδ2)q=0,1,... is a martingale. Therefore, due to the stopping theorem for
uniformly integrable martingales, if P is in Dl then δ2E[τ] is equal to E[(P τ)2−P 2].
Since P τ belongs almost surely to {0,1} and E[P τ] = P, we get E[(P τ)2 − P 2] =








n→+∞τ ∧ n] =
δ
2





The convergence of V l
n(P) to gl(P) is thus proved for P ∈ Dl. Due to the concavity
of V l
n the convergence will hold clearly for all point in [0,1], and the theorem is
proved.
Let us observe that the above described strategy σn,l is in fact not an optimal
strategy in the game Gl
n(P). The amount Cl




n(1−P) while V l
n(P) is not (see graphs 1 and 2). We have no explicit
expression of the optimal strategies in Gl
n(P), but heuristically, these strategies
should be close to σn,l, at least for large n.
As a corollary of theorem 3.1, we have the uniform convergence of
V l
n √
n to 0. This
indicates that the continuous and the discrete models are quite diﬀerent. In partic-
ular, we do not expect to have the appearance of a Brownian motion as n goes to
inﬁnity for a ﬁxed l in the asymptotic dynamics of the price process in the discretized
games. More precisely, let us consider player 1’s price process in Gl
n(P) when using
σn,l. Up to an error δ, this process is equal to the a posteriori martingale. As in [4]
(see theorem 2.4 in this paper), this a posteriori martingale may be represented by
the continuous time process Πn, with Πn




n [. Now, if q ≥ τ, then
P q ∈ {0,1}. Therefore Πn
t ∈ {0,1} whenever t ≥ τ/n. We get therefore:
Theorem 3.2. As n increases to ∞, the process Πn converges in law to a splitting
martingale Π that jumps at time 0 to 0 or 1 and then remains constant.
However, we prove in the last section of the paper that, in some sense, for moderate
n, the continuous model remains a good approximation of the discrete one: more
precisely, we discretize the optimal strategies in the continuous game, and we show
that these discretized strategies guarantee V l
n(P) −  in Gl
n(P), with  proportional











The next section is devoted to the lemmas used in the proof of theorem 3.1: we
analyze the properties of the recursive operator of the game and we ﬁnd out its
positive ﬁxed point gl.CONTINUOUS VERSUS DISCRETE MARKET GAMES 11
4. A positive fixed point for T
4.1. Some properties of T.
We start this section by proving some easy properties of T.
Let us ﬁrst observe that the value u(P) of the average game with antisymmetric
payoﬀ matrix A(P) := PAH + (1 − P)AL is equal to 0. The optimal strategy for
both players is the pure strategy bPc deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 4.1. For all P in [0,1]:
let bPc = [P
δ ]δ and dPe = bPc + δ ( [x] is the highest integer less or equal to x).
If player 1 uses the pure strategy bPc, independently of H,L in the deﬁnition
(3.1) of T(g)(P), he plays a non revealing strategy (P 1 = P). The ﬁrst stage payoﬀ
in T(g)(P) is just the payoﬀ in the average game which is clearly positive. This
leads to the following lemma:
Lemma 4.2. T is increasing and, for all g: g ≤ T(g).
As a consequence, we have:
Lemma 4.3. A positive ﬁxed point of T is an upper bound for V l
n.
Let indeed g be a positive ﬁxed point of T then we have for n = 0: V l
0 = 0 ≤ g.
By induction we get next that, if V l
n ≤ g, then V l
n+1 = T(V l
n) ≤ T(g) = g. 
Unfortunately, the ﬁxed points of T are not easy to ﬁnd, we will therefore bound
T from above by an operator T ∗ and we will apply the next lemma.
Lemma 4.4. Let T ∗ such that T ≤ T ∗.
Then a ﬁxed point of T ∗ is a ﬁxed point of T.
Indeed, g ≤ T(g) ≤ T ∗(g) = g.
We will next introduce the operator T ∗.
The deﬁnition (3.2) of T(g)(P) contains a minimization over player 2’s action jδ.
If instead of minimizing, Player 2 plays in that formula jδ = bPc, we obtain an






σ(i)[1 1iδ>bPc(P(i) − iδ) + 1 1iδ<bPc(bPc − P(i)) + g(P(i))]










σ(i)[1 1iδ>bPc(P(i) − dPe) + 1 1iδ<bPc(bPc − P(i)) + g(P(i))]
Finally, (σ,P(.)) generates a probability distribution on K × Dl. As mentioned
above, the max in the deﬁnition of T 1(g) is in fact a max over all probability
distribution Π on K ×Dl such that Π[k = H] = P. A general procedure to generate12 ALEXANDRE MARINO AND BERNARD DE MEYER
such probabilities is as follows: given σ,P(.) and a one to one mapping i from L to
L where L = {0,...,l − 1}, the lottery σ is used to select a virtual action ˜ ı, player
1 plays in fact i(˜ ı). The state of nature is chosen according to the lottery P(˜ ı).
Therefore we infer that
T1(g) = max





σ˜ ı[1 1i(˜ ı)δ>bPc(P˜ ı−dPe)+1 1i(˜ ı)δ<bPc(bPc−P˜ ı)+g(P˜ ı)]












σ˜ ı[1 1i(˜ ı)δ>bPc(P˜ ı−dPe)+1 1i(˜ ı)δ<bPc(bPc−P˜ ı)+g(P˜ ı)]
The max over i : L → L in the last formula can be solved explicitly:
Whenever P˜ ı ≥ (
bPc+dPe




Similarly, if P˜ ı < (
bPc+dPe
2 ), then i(˜ ı) <
bPc
δ .






σ˜ ı[1 1i(˜ ı)δ>bPc(P˜ ı − dPe) + 1 1i(˜ ı)δ<bPc(bPc − P˜ ı)] = Eσ[Fp(P˜ ı)]
with:
FP(P˜ ı) = 1 1P˜ ı≥(
bPc+dPe
2 )(P˜ ı − dPe) + 1 1P˜ ı<(
bPc+dPe
2 )(bPc − P˜ ı).
Note that for all P in [0,1], FP=FbPc.
The above result leads us to a new expression of T ∗: For all P in [0,1]:
T
∗(g)(P) = max
{(σ˜ ı,P˜ ı) st Eσ[P˜ ı]=p}
Eσ[FbPc(P˜ ı) + g(P˜ ı)]
Deﬁnition 4.6. The concaviﬁcation cav(f) of a function f is the smallest concave
function higher than f which is concave.





In particular, the ﬁxed point of T ∗ are concave.CONTINUOUS VERSUS DISCRETE MARKET GAMES 13
4.2. A ﬁxed point of T ∗.
In this section, we seek for a ﬁxed point of T ∗.
T ∗ is increasing (g ≤ T(g) ≤ T ∗(g)). As a consequence:
Proposition 4.7. g is a ﬁxed point of T ∗ if and only if
∀P ∈ [0,1], cavP0(FbPc(P 0) + g(P 0))(P) ≤ g(P).
We will seek for a ﬁxed point g with the particularity that g = mind∈Dl gd, where
for all d, gd linear on IR and for all P ∈ [0,1] g(P) = gbPc(P). ( this means that g
is linear between two successive points of Dl )





Since gd is linear for all d in Dl, and since the concaviﬁcation of a negative function
is negative, we are led to the following lemma:





then g is a ﬁxed point of T ∗.
We use the equality g = mind(gd) to simplify (4.1). The following lemma leads to
an explicit expression of a ﬁxed point of T ∗.









then g = mind∈Dl(gd) is a ﬁxed point of T ∗. With the convention g−δ := g0.
Indeed, since g = mind∈Dl(gd), we get for all P and P 0 in [0,1]:
g(P 0) ≤ 1 1P0≤bPcgbPc−δ (P 0) + 1 1bPc<P0<dPegbPc(P 0) + 1 1P0≥dPegdPe(P 0),
therefore for all P and P 0 in [0,1],
FbPc(P0) + g(P0) − gbPc(P0) ≤ 1 1P0≥(
bPc+dPe
2 )(P0 − dPe) + 1 1P0<(
bPc+dPe
2 )(bPc − P0) + ···
··· + 1 1P0≤bPc(gbPc−δ (P0) − gbPc(P0)) + ···
··· + 1 1P0≥dPe(gdPe(P0) − gbPc(P0))
Since 1 1dPe>P0>(
bPc+dPe
2 )(P 0 − dPe) ≤ 0 and 1 1bPc<P0<(
bPc+dPe
2 )(bPc − P 0) ≤ 0, we infer









In particular, if the linear functions gd satisfy to gdPe(P 0) = gbPc(P 0) − P 0 + dPe
for all P and P 0 in [0,1] then the function gl = mind gd veriﬁes the condition of the
previous lemma.14 ALEXANDRE MARINO AND BERNARD DE MEYER
The following set of gd has all those properties:
∀i ∈ {0,l − 1}, ∀P ∈ [0,1], giδ(P) := ( l
2 − 1 − i)P + i(i + 1)δ
2
The resulting function gl may be computed explicitly: giδ(P) is a quadratic convex
expression of iδ. It is symmetric around iδ = P − δ/2. The minimum on iδ ∈ Dl
is thus reached at the point of Dl that is closest to P − δ/2. This point is clearly
iδ = bPc, and thus
g
l(P) = gbPc(P) = (l/2 − 1 − bPc/δ)(P − bPc) + bPc(1 − bPc)
1
2δ
This is exactly the function gl introduced in theorem 3.1. It is symmetric around 1
2
on [0,1]).
As a consequence of the previous discussion, we get the following theorem
Theorem 4.10. gl is a positive ﬁxed point of T ∗ and thus of T.
We next compute optimal strategies of player 1 in T(gl)(P) as well as best replies
of player 2:
Theorem 4.11. If P belongs to Dl\{0,1} then the following strategy (σH,σL) is
optimal in T(gl)(P): σH and σL are lotteries on the prices P and P − with σH(P) =
P+
2P and σL(P) = 1−P+
2(1−P) where P + := P + δ and P − := P − δ.
The best reply of player 2 in T(gl)(P) against that strategy is to post a price equal
to P.
Proof :
With that strategy, player 1 plays P with probability PσH(P) + (1 − P)σL(P) = 1
2
and therefore P 1(P) is equal to 2PσH(P) = P +. Similarly player 1 plays P −
with probability PσH(P −) + (1 − P)σL(P −) = 1
2 and therefore P 1(P −) is equal to
2PσH(P −) = P −. So, when player 1 uses that strategy, the ﬁrst stage payoﬀ in










−) + 1 1P−<jδ(jδ − P
−)]
In case jδ ≤ P −, only the ﬁrst term is not equal to 0 and so the payoﬀ is equal to δ
2.
In case jδ = P, only the last term remains and the expectation is also δ
2. The last
case to consider is jδ ≥ P +, then we obtain jδ−1
2(P ++P −) = jδ−P ≥ δ. From this,
we obtain that the price jδ = P is a best reply against that strategy and the ﬁrst
stage payoﬀ is δ
2. The second term payoﬀ is then 1
2gl(P +)+ 1
2gl(P −) = gl(P)− δ
2, so
as announced the above strategy guarantees gl(P) = T(gl)(P) and it is thus optimal
in T(gl)(P).
Remark 4.12. The following graphs are drawn from numerical computation of V l
n.
It indicates in particular that V l
n is not symmetric around 1
2 and thus V l
n does not
coincide with Cl





























5. Continuous versus discrete market game
As indicated in the previous section, the continuous and the discrete games are
quite diﬀerent. However, we prove in this section that, in some sense, for moderate16 ALEXANDRE MARINO AND BERNARD DE MEYER
n, the continuous model remains a good approximation of the discrete one: more
precisely, we discretize the optimal strategies in the continuous game, and we show
that these discretized strategies guarantee V l
n(P) −  in Gl
n(P), with  proportional










n/l(n) → 0. This is the content of theorem 5.2.
Let us remark that the expression of V c
n involves the sum of n independent random
variables. For n too small (n < 20), even in the continuous model, there is not
enough independent random variables in these sums for the central limit theorem
to be applied. However, as it results from the next theorem, if l is large enough,
for middle values of n (20 < n  l), the continuous game is a good approximation
of the discrete game. The discretized optimal strategies of the continuous game are
close to be optimal in the discrete game, and the resulting price process will be the
discretization of the price process in the continuous game: For n high enough, it
involves a Brownian motion.
As reminded in section 2, player 1’s strategies in the ﬁrst stage of Gl
n are rep-
resented by a pair (fl,Ql) satisfying (1), (2) and (3) of (2.1) with the additional
requirement on fl to be Dl valued. We denote Γl
1(P) the space of these strate-
gies. Similarly player 2 strategy space Γl
2 will be the set of increasing functions
hl : [0,1] → Dl.
In this section we will compare the payoﬀ guaranteed in Gl




l) of the optimal strategy (f◦,Q◦) (resp h◦ ) in Gc
n(P) to get the
next theorem.
Deﬁnition 5.1. If dxe denotes the smallest d ∈ Dl that dominates x, the discretiza-
tion Πl(f,Q) := (fl,Ql) of the strategy (f,Q) is deﬁned as: fl := dfe and Ql(α)
is the expectation of Q(u) given that fl(u) = fl(α) where u is a uniform random
variable on [0,1]. (Similarly Πl(h) := dhe)
Theorem 5.2. The discretized optimal strategies of Gc
n(P) are nδ-optimal strategies
in Gl
n(P). Therefore:





where δ = 1
l−1.
With the previous strategy spaces, the recurrence operator T for V l
n, deﬁned in
(3.2), can be written as:
For all P ∈ [0,1]:
T(g)(P) := sup(f,Q)∈Γl
1(P)infp2∈DlF((f,Q),p2,g),
with F as in theorem 2.1.
Lemma 5.3. For all n in IN, if (f◦,Q◦) are optimal strategies in the ﬁrst stage of
Gc











In particular T c(V c
n) ≤ T(V c
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n) = E[1 1f◦>p2(Q◦ − f◦) + 1 1p2>f◦(p2 − Q◦) + V c
n(Q◦)]
= E[1 1f◦
l >p2(Q◦ − f◦) + 1 1p2>f◦
l (p2 − Q◦) + V c
n(Q◦)]
+ E[1 1{f◦
l =p2&f◦<p2}(p2 − Q◦)]
= E[1 1f◦
l >p2(Q◦ − f◦
l ) + 1 1p2>f◦








l =p2&f◦<p2}(f◦ − Q◦)]
Since we have 0 ≤ f◦
l −f◦ ≤ δ and as proved on page 298 in [4], f◦ −Q◦ ≤ 0, the
second expectation in last equation is clearly bounded by δ and thus:
F((f◦,Q◦),p2,V c
n) ≤ E[1 1f◦
l >p2(Q◦ − f◦
l ) + 1 1p2>f◦




l ] and both 1 1f◦
l >p2 and 1 1f◦
l <p2 are f◦
l measurable, we may replace
Q◦ by Q◦
l in the two ﬁrst terms of the last inequality. Furthermore, due to Jensen in-
equality and the concavity of V c
n, we get E[V c
n(Q◦)] ≤ E[V c
n(E[Q◦|f◦
l ])] = E[V c
n(Q◦
l)].




n)+δ follows then immediately.
Finally, since (f◦,Q◦) is optimal, we have
T c(V c
n) = minp2∈[0,1] F((f◦,Q◦),p2,V c
n)












Proposition 5.4. ∀l, ∀n ≥ 1: V c
n − V l
n ≤ nδ
The proof is by induction:
The result is clearly true for n = 0 (V c
n = V l
n = 0). Next, if the result is true for n
then it holds also for n + 1:
Indeed,
V c





n + nδ)(P) + δ
= T(V l
n)(P) + (n + 1)δ
= V l
n+1(P) + (n + 1)δ

To deal with the reverse inequality ∀l, ∀n ≥ 1 : V l
n − V c
n ≤ nδ, we will work on
the dual model:
Let us consider the concave functions W c
n and W l
n respectively deﬁned as the Fenchel
conjugate of V c
n and V l
n. Due to (2.2), we just have to prove that





These functions are the value of dual games characterized by a recursive structure.
The recursive formula for W c
n was proved in theorem 4.5 in [4], and reminded in the-
orem 2.3. The same argument as in lemma 4.4 in [4], but with Dl valued strategies,18 ALEXANDRE MARINO AND BERNARD DE MEYER










with R as in theorem 2.3.
The inequality in the last formula could be replaced by an equality, and this would
lead to the dual recursive formula for the ﬁnite games as deﬁne in [5].
Lemma 5.5. For all x in IR, for all n in IN, if h◦ is optimal strategy in the ﬁrst









In particular Λc(W c
n) ≤ Λ(W c
n) + δ.
Indeed, with the notation h◦










To simplify the notations, let us consider h◦(u) (with u uniformly distributed) as
a random variable h◦ then
R 1
0 1 1h◦(u)<p1 − 1 1h◦(u)>p1du is just equal to A(h◦) := −1 +
2Prob(h◦ < p1) + Prob(h◦ = p1).
Next:
A(h◦) = − 1 + 2Prob(h◦
l < p1) + 2Prob(h◦
l = p1&h◦ < p1) + ···
··· + Prob(h◦
l = p1) − Prob(h◦
l = p1&h◦ < p1)
= − 1 + 2Prob(h◦
l < p1) + Prob(h◦
l = p1) + Prob(h◦
l = p1&h◦ < p1)
= A(h◦
l) + Prob(h◦
l = p1&h◦ < p1)
Therefore, due to the concavity of W c
n:
W c
n(x − A(h◦)) = W c
n(x − A(h◦
l) − Prob(h◦








n)0 stands for the derivative of W c
n. Next, (W c
n)0(x − A(h◦
l)) = (W c
n)0(x +
1 − 2ζ), with ζ := Prob(h◦
l < p1) +
Prob(h◦
l =p1)




n)0(x + 1 − 2s)ds/u2.
Due to the concavity of W c
n, (W c
n)0 is a decreasing decreasing function, therefore, if
s ≤ u, then (W c
n)0(x + 1 − 2s) ≤ (W c












0(x + 1 − 2u)
and so: − (W c
n)0(x − A(h◦
l)) ≤ −h◦(ζ) ≤ −h◦
l(ζ) + δ.
We claim next that Prob(h◦
l = p1&h◦ < p1)h◦
l(ζ) = Prob(h◦
l = p1&h◦ < p1)p1.
Indeed, we just analyze the case Prob(h◦
l = p1&h◦ < p1) > 0: let us deﬁne x0 :=
Prob(h◦
l ≤ p1 − δ) and x1 := Prob(h◦
l ≤ p1). Since h◦ is continuous and increasing
and since x → dxe is left continuous, increasing, h◦
l is left continuous, increasing.
Therefore {u|h◦
l(u) ≤ p1 − δ} is the closed interval [0,α] whose length is precisely
Prob(h◦
l ≤ p1 − δ). Therefore α = x0 and thus h◦
l(x0) ≤ p1 − δ. We ﬁnd similarly
h◦
l(x1) ≤ p1. Now, since 0 < Prob(h◦
l = p1) = x1 − x0, we infer that on ]x0,x1],CONTINUOUS VERSUS DISCRETE MARKET GAMES 19
h◦














◦ < p1)(p1 − δ)
We next deal with the term −
R 1
0 1 1h◦(u)<p1(−p1)+1 1h◦(u)>p1h◦(u)du in R(p1,h◦,W c
n).




l (u)<p1(−p1) + 1 1h◦
l (u)>p1h◦
l(u)du + Prob(h◦


















l − h◦ ≤ δ, the inequality R[x](p1,h◦,W c
n) ≤ R[x](p1,h◦
l,W c
n) + δ follows
then immediately.
Finally, since h◦ is optimal, we have
Λc(W c
n)(x) = minp1∈[0,1] R[x](p1,h◦,W c
n)











Proposition 5.6. ∀l, ∀n ≥ 1 : W c
n − W l
n ≤ nδ
The proof is by induction:
The result is clearly true for n = 0 (W c
0 = W l
0). If the result is true for n then it
holds also for n + 1:
Indeed,
W c





n + nδ) + δ
= Λ(W l
n) + (n + 1)δ
= W l
n+1 + (n + 1)δ
The result holds thus for all n. 
6. Conclusion
The results of section 3 indicate that the normal density does not appear in the
asymptotic behavior of Ψl
n, as n goes to inﬁnity for a ﬁxed l. In particular, we
have seen in that case (see theorem 3.2) that the limit price process Π is a splitting
martingale that jumps at time 0 to 0 or 1 and then remains constant. The eﬀect
of the discretization is to force the informed player to reveal is information much20 ALEXANDRE MARINO AND BERNARD DE MEYER
sooner than in the continuous model. The discretization improves the eﬃciency of
the prices.
Theorem 5.2 in terms of Ψn reads:






This implies in particular that if the size l(n) of the discretization set increases
with the number n of transaction stages in such a way that limn→+∞
l(n) √
n = +∞, then
Ψ
l(n)
n converges to the same limit as Ψc
n, and in that case, the normal distribution
does appear. The discretized optimal strategies of the continuous games are then
close to be optimal in the discrete game, and the brownian motion will appear in
the asymptotic of the price process. Therefore, the continuous game remains a good
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